

The profiles method is a useful tool for diagnosing and repairing this kind of *ad verecundiam* fallacy. Apart from identifying the fallacious instances of arguments from expert opinion, the more general aim of applying the profiles of dialogue method is to provide a structure that can be used to investigate strategic maneuvering. This task requires a formal dialectical structure, and in addition, an adaptation of the structure to a simpler form, such as the graph structure of the profiles of dialogue technique as proposed in this paper, that can be used to track the sequence of speech acts in a dialogue through the various moves.

By allowing us to identify a fallacy as a particular sequence of dialogue moves, the profiles method offers also a profile-of-dialogue approach to the concept of informal fallacy. Instead of concentrating on the negative aspect of using the concept of fallacy as merely a device for spotting the logical error in someone's argument, the profiles method offers the possibility of not only diagnosing the error or shortcoming, but also the capability of showing the other party how to diagnose and repair her argument so that it can be improved.

So conceived, fallacy becomes more than just a device for putting somebody down. The fallacious sequence of dialogue moves becomes a constructive device for argument diagnosis and repair. For this reason, adopting the profiles method suggests a much better approach to the concept of fallacy that departs from the negative approach inherent in the traditional textbook treatments criticized by Hamblin [8]. Once the profiles approach has been accepted, it becomes outmoded to talk about the *ad verecundiam* as a 'gotcha' move to attack an opponent for having committing a fallacy.

Using this method we are able to achieve a more balanced approach to arguments from expert opinion that sees them as very often reasonable but subject to a variety of correctable faults that can be diagnosed and repaired as they occur (or not) in specific cases. The argument analyst compares the two graphs to examine and analyze what was missing or inappropriate in the descriptive graph, and by moving to the normative graph can diagnose the nature of the problem and build a recommendation on how to fix it. The profiles method enables us to go beyond merely identifying the problem, for example by associating it with a traditional informal fallacy category, but also to go beyond that to finding a way to repair the fault. The beauty of the profiles method is that works as a fault diagnosis tool that can not only find a fault, but also show how it can be fixed.



8. Conclusions

In this paper it has been shown that the existing argumentation scheme approach to arguments from expert opinion, although it is vitally important in identifying the structure of appeals to expert authority, does not do full justice to grasping the complexity of an *ad verecundiam* technique. As we have argued, a thorough examination of the sequence of speech acts in the dialogue profile of an *ad verecundiam* technique is helpful in exposing not only its failure to meet the requirements of the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, but also for grasping how it is a dialectical failure that is used to suppress critical questioning and counter arguments in order to block the argumentation off from getting further toward its legitimate goal.

The profiles method works by comparing two sequences of dialogue. The descriptive sequence represents how the dialogue actually went, by displaying the interconnected moves and counter moves that can be reconstructed from the text in a given case. The normative sequence represents how the dialogue ideally should have gone, in order for the fault to be overcome and dealt with appropriately. By juxtaposing the one graph with the other, the fallacious *ad verecundiam* argument can not only be diagnosed as a fault in argumentation but also the means for repairing the fault are given.

Previously, dialectical profiles have been used as analytical representations, for example by the pragma-dialectical school, to represent all analytically possible moves in an ideal discussion called the critical discussion. But this use of profiles does not show how existing formal dialogue structures can be applied to the analysis and evaluation of real cases of the *ad verecundiam* fallacy. What we have devised is a practical tool for the analysis of given cases where an *ad verecundiam* fallacy is suspected. This tool derives from the formal models of dialogue in the literature, such as [30]. It works, as we have shown, by comparing a normative profile to a descriptive profile. The problem posed by this earlier literature was that the elaborate apparatus of formal dialogue structures, in which each individual formal dialogue type has its own particular protocol, it is simply too unwieldy for students of informal logic and other users of argumentation to easily apply, even with significant training. Our version of the profiles tool defines it formally as a graph structure, but a simple one that can handily be applied to problems of analyzing and evaluating real arguments in natural language

discourse without having to explicitly bring in all the protocols of the applicable formal dialogue structures that are there in the background. The application of the tool also reveals a means for repairing the fault.

Technically, profiles of dialogue are very close to the dialogue templates used by Bex and Reed [2] as schematic representations that combine argument structures with transitions in the dialogue from a move to a reply. Dialogue templates look very much like the profiles in this paper, and they are visualized as graphs that look somewhat like familiar argument diagrams except that they represent dialogue sequences in formal dialogues such as CB.² If we look back to Figure 3, the dialogue shown at the bottom left in the large rounded rectangle node can be seen as a dialogue template. Further research is needed to establish the exact relationship between dialogue templates and profiles of dialogue. It would appear that profiles work in a comparable way to dialogue templates that can also incorporate arguments in some instances.

In this paper it has been shown that the existing argumentation scheme approach to arguments from expert opinion, although it is vitally important in identifying the structure of appeals to expert authority, does not do full justice to grasping the complexity of the *ad verecundiam* technique. As we have argued, a thorough examination of the sequence of speech acts in the dialogue profile in the *ad verecundiam* technique is helpful in exposing not only its failure to meet the requirements of the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, but also for grasping how it is a dialectical failure that is used to suppress critical questioning and counter arguments in order to block the argumentation off from getting further to its legitimate goal.

In particular, it has been shown that some real life examples of examination dialogues (as illustrated by the Zeidman example) illustrate how the profiles technique can successfully be applied to cases where the sophisticated tactics type of *ad verecundiam* strategic maneuvering is a highly powerful and dangerous type of argumentation. This particular example is a very interesting one because it brings out a novel and heretofore largely uninvestigated aspect of the *ad verecundiam* fallacy. Our findings provide evidence to suggest that widening our horizons on

² The dialogue system CB [22, pp. 133–135] consists of locution rules (that determine permissible locutions, withdrawals, questions and challenges), commitment rules (that indicate e.g. when a statement can be included in or withdrawn from a player's commitment store) and dialogue rules (that state what is the proper sequence of dialogue moves).



how to study this fallacy will enable argument analysts to tackle very important cases that are highly worthwhile to study when one realizes the problems they give rise to.

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