

Value-based Argumentation in Mass Audience Persuasion Dialogues

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Abstract: An example is used to show how mass audience persuasion dialogue prominently uses the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning. The example uses a rhetorical persuasion strategy of tilting the balance of public opinion towards acceptance of marijuana by emphasizing its health benefits to mothers. It is shown (1) that there are ten rules for building a successful mass persuasion strategy, and (2) that the current argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning needs to be reconfigured before it can properly be used to evaluate such arguments by taking critical questions and counter-arguments into account.

Key Words: rhetorical argumentation, persuasion dialogue, instrumental practical reasoning, argument from values, argumentation schemes, critical questions.

1. Introduction

Arguments that appeal to values are fundamentally important in rhetoric. An example cited by Tindale (2016, 10-15) is a speech given by former U.S. President Obama in Washington DC in August 2009. The speech, a eulogy for Sen. Edward Kennedy, began with a description of Kennedy's life, and then shifted to an exposition on how the lessons of his life relate to the lives of the audience. Obama's speech portrayed himself as an ethical champion of change infused with the spirit of Kennedy's championship of change. The arguments put forward by Obama in the speech were all based on values (Tindale, 2016, 13). Arguments from values were used to create the right dispositions in the audience to lead them to bringing about positive actions. The analysis of the speech by Tindale brings out how Obama based the arguments on values deriving from the heroic example of Kennedy and directed them towards the values of the audience.

Persuasion dialogue of the kind currently defined in dialectical argumentation studies (Prakken, 2006) can be contrasted with the traditional view which sees rhetoric as a unilateral process by which a speaker persuades an audience (Jacobs, 2000, 261). Dialectical argumentation takes persuasion dialogue as an exchange of arguments where the goal of the speaker is to persuade the audience to accept the speaker's claim by using rational arguments (Hamblin, 1970, 1971). The paradigm of dialectical argumentation is that of a dialogue structure in which each side takes turns making moves such as asking questions or putting forward arguments (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). However, it has sometimes been recognized that these two subjects are connected because both use the same kinds of arguments to try to overcome doubt and answer objections (Jacobs, 2000, 262). Both are taken to be based on forms of argument called argumentation schemes.

The study of argumentation schemes, or forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, is at the core of argumentation research. Everyday argumentation in persuasion, deliberation and negotiation is grounded on these patterns of reasoning. The most interesting argumentation schemes have been put forward as a helpful way of characterizing structures of human reasoning that have proved troublesome to view deductively. Many argumentation schemes of this sort have been identified in the literature (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008). One of these is the scheme for goal-directed practical reasoning, a form of argument known to be central to both deliberative rhetoric and formal models of deliberation in computational argumentation (McBurney et al., 2007; Walton and Toniolo, 2016). As will be shown below, there are two kinds of practical reasoning, instrumental practical reasoning and value-based practical reasoning.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, in *The New Rhetoric* (1969) consistently held and supported the general view that rhetorical argumentation depends on practical reasoning, but they also maintained that values need to be combined with facts in practical reasoning of the kind that is ubiquitous in legal, political, and ethical argumentation. But as this paper will show, rhetorical argumentation must by its nature be combined with dialectical argumentation of the kind represented by argumentation schemes for practical reasoning. Otherwise, as demonstrated by the example analyzed in this paper, there is a great danger of the exploitation of value-based argumentation by marketers who exploit it in ways that should be questioned.

Values, for the purpose of this paper, may be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action or outcomes. A distinction can be drawn between personal values and cultural values, but the two kinds of values are highly interdependent. A culture is a social system sharing a set of common values. Personal values are types of actions or principles that link to actions as commitments of an agent concerning what kinds of outcomes are taken to be worth upholding and promoting (Macagno and Walton, 2014). Values can also be ranked in an ordering of importance, so that in a case where an action being contemplated is based on two conflicting values, there is room for resolving the conflict. Political problems commonly arise when agents fail to realize that arguments based on moral, religious and personal values are defeasible. If arguments based on values are taken to be conclusive and not subject to revision, the resulting rigid thinking can lead to extremism and war.

This brief discussion of how to define and argue about values itself is only tentative, because there are deep disagreements in the field of ethics about how values are to be defined, and what role they should play in argumentation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, 74-79). However, a few points can be noted. One is that there are systems of values made up from rules that express values, as well as exceptions to the rules that can be applied in some particular situations. Such a value system can be said to be minimally consistent where, even if one rule conflicts with another in a particular case, provided that exceptions to the rules are consistently applied. Value-based argumentation typically takes the form of applying defeasible rules to individual cases where the rule has the form of an assumption that is open to questioning.

One problem with arguments from values is that in general it may be difficult for one agent to try to figure out what the values of another agent really are. It may even be difficult in some cases to determine what one's own values are. Philosophical argumentation can be helpful for this purpose. One might cite Socratic dialogues as examples where philosophical argumentation in the form of dialogue exchanges is used to determine what an arguer's values are.

A distinction can be drawn between instrumental and intrinsic values. Something is said to be intrinsically valuable if it is taken to be valuable in itself, rather than as a means to something else. In contrast, something is said to be instrumentally valuable if it is worth having as a means for obtaining something else that is of value. Instrumental practical reasoning is a form of argumentation in which an agent's goals are combined with its knowledge about the circumstances of the case in order to derive a conclusion about what to do in a situation requiring choice. In value-based practical reasoning, such an argument is based on the agent's values as well as its goals. Arguments from values attach a high value to an action or policy deemed to be "good", and a low value to an action deemed to be "bad". Such arguments are based on a preference ordering of actions or policies, aimed at persuading an audience which actions of a set of choices available are the ones that should be pursued. In this paper, it is shown how a real example about the way to solve the perceived problem of overcoming the negative perception of

marijuana by emphasizing its health benefits can be modeled using the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning.

2. Instrumental Practical Reasoning

Mass persuasion of the kind used in marketing and political discourse can be illustrated by an example in an article on recent trends on the legalization of recreational use of marijuana (“The Mother of All Highs”, no author given, *The Economist*, October 17, 2015, p. 34). The article begins by describing current circumstances suggesting that in the future there will be growing general acceptance of the recreational use of marijuana.

At a soirée on the outskirts of Denver, Colorado, one woman greets her fellow guests with a delicate bowl of vanilla sea-salt caramels, each one laced with marijuana. “It’s quite subtle,” she insists. “I just keep a few in my bag for when I’m feeling stressed out.” Over light chat about family and work, the group quickly cleaned up the bowl. It is a scene Americans will be accustomed to by about 2025, according to Jazmin Hupp, head of Denver’s Women Grow society. “Once moms are on board, that’s it,” she explains, taking a drag on a hot pink e-cigarette filled with cannabis oil. Her battle cry explains the recent surge in products such as vegan weed bonbons, cannabis kale crisps, cannabis spiced almonds and “high tea”.

From this picturesque beginning, the article goes on to draft a persuasion strategy based on the current trend depicted in the quotation to try to win wider public acceptance for marijuana.

The persuasion problem posed by this case is the task of shifting public opinion toward acceptance of cannabis as appropriate for recreational use. The problem posed is that although this proposal is gaining increasing numbers of proponents, currently it is not acceptable to mothers, who tend to see the story of cannabis as symbolized by male figures such as drug lords, rappers and rock stars, as well as businessmen active in the movement to legalize cannabis. The current “story”, the way marijuana appears to public opinion, does not include mothers as an audience, or, if they are, the unhealthy or detrimental aspects of marijuana are emphasized. However, as the article points out by citing some research, mothers control \$1.6 trillion of direct consumer spending by influencing household buying habits. So-called “soccer moms” are so influential to marketing and political decisions that they allegedly returned Bill Clinton to the White House. Furthermore mothers tend to make family medical decisions. These three arguments are given to support the claim that one way to solve the problem of a negative attitude towards marijuana by mothers is to persuade them that marijuana boosts rather than imperils health. Therefore, the key to solving the problem is to win over mothers to accepting cannabis.

There are three stages in the persuasion dialogue in this example. The first stage is the opening stage where the problem is stated as being one of carrying out the task of shifting public opinion toward acceptance of cannabis as appropriate for recreational use. Clearly, therefore, this example is a case of persuasion over action. But the specific sub-problem preventing a solution to the overall problem is the fact that acceptance of cannabis for recreational use is currently not acceptable to mothers, who have a negative opinion about marijuana. At this opening stage of the persuasion dialogue the broad target audience of mothers is selected as the object of the strategy for the persuasion dialogue, and especially “soccer moms” are selected out as the focus.

A way to model the argumentation in this example is to use the argumentation scheme for practical reasoning, a form of argument in which a rational agent reasons from its goal and the particular circumstances of a case known to the agent to draw a conclusion on what to do in these circumstances. This form of practical reasoning is purely instrumental. Values are not in the

forefront. Consider the example of a man who is trying to fix his printer. He was prevented from using it when a black line began to appear vertically down the middle of each page he printed (Walton, 2015, 149). To try to solve this problem he took the printer apart. But, since he could still not prevent the black line from appearing, he accessed the website of the company who made the printer and found instructions on the website of the manufacturer giving instructions on how to correct this problem. The procedure included having to remove a glass plate located at the top of the printer, and then extract and clean another part of the printer under the glass plate. Values are perhaps in the background in such a case, but the problem is essentially a practical one that is solved by collecting more information about the factual circumstances, in this case information from the website about this particular printer on how to fix certain kinds of malfunctions.

This example represents a simple form of instrumental practical reasoning, also often called practical inference (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 323). In the instrumental argumentation scheme for practical reasoning below, the first-person pronoun ‘I’ represents a rational agent that has the capability of carrying out actions based on its goals.

Premise 1: I have a goal *G*.

Premise 2: Bringing about *A* is a means to realize *G*.

Conclusion: Therefore, I ought (practically speaking) to carry out this action *A*.

In this scheme an action is described as an instance of an agent bringing about, or making true, a proposition *A*, *B*, *C*, The conclusion is expressed in the form of what is called a practical ought-statement. The practical reasoning sequence shown in figure 1 is shown as being based on the instrumental scheme.

This scheme is a helpful tool for understanding the sequence of reasoning in the marijuana example. The first step is to formulate the problem in general outline. For this purpose, the article begins by laying out the following line of reasoning: since health is generally an important goal for the majority in the population that forms or influences public opinion, and in particular, family health is clearly very important to mothers, a way to solve the problem is to tilt the balance between the traditional negative perception of marijuana as harmful and dangerous, to a positive perception of marijuana as a form of therapy that can contribute to health.




Figure 1: Formulation of the Persuasion Problem at the Opening Stage

This formulation of the problem is shown in figure 1. Following the conventions of the Carneades Argumentation System (Gordon, 2010), the rectangular nodes represent propositions (premises and conclusions) while the round nodes represent arguments. What is importantly shown in figure 1 is that the procedure of formulating the problem is itself an argument combining three arguments into a sequence. When the argumentation is represented in this way, it is shown to be represented as an instance of instrumental practical reasoning from premises about goals to a conclusion, offering a way to solve the problem posed. However, note that beneath the surface, values are involved. Argument a2 is based on the premise that family health is very important to mothers. If family health is seen as a goal for mothers, the practical reasoning remains purely instrumental. But if we interpret this premise as expressing the proposition that family health is a very important value to mothers, the argument becomes an instance of value-based reasoning. Also, it could be noted that the second premise of argument a1 states that health is an important goal for the majority that forms public opinion. This statement could be taken as expressing the proposition that health is an important value for the majority that forms public opinion. So, the question is raised whether values might be involved as well as goals in the kind of reasoning used to draw the conclusion.

3. Value-based Practical Reasoning

In other cases, values are in the forefront where practical reasoning is used. For example, political debates and deliberations are heavily based on values, including shared values of groups of participants in the debate. In such cases it is necessary to use a value-based variant of the scheme for practical reasoning to properly analyze the argumentation and explicitly bring out all the premises that were used to support the conclusion. However the argumentation used in figure 1 is implicitly based on values. To represent this aspect we must turn to the value-based variant of practical reasoning, and to value-based argumentation frameworks.

Bench-Capon (2002; 2003, 447) introduced value-based practical reasoning to handle cases of disagreement in persuasion dialogue where the disputants disagree because the issue at stake “depends on the relative strengths of the arguments for an audience, which in turn relates to the values to which the arguments pertain”. A value-based argumentation framework (Bench-Capon, 2003) is defined as a 5-tuple $\langle A, R, V, val, valprefs \rangle$ where A is a set of arguments, R is a binary relation on the set of arguments, V is a set of values, val is a mapping that takes each element of A to an element of V , and $valprefs$ is an irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive preference relation on $V \times V$. The *cross-product* $A \times B$ of two sets A and B , is the set whose members are all possible ordered pairs where a is a member of A and b is a member of B .

The argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning below (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 324) was formulated by Bench-Capon (2003).

Premise 1: I have a goal G .

Premise 2: G is supported by my set of values, V .

Premise 3: Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about G .

Conclusion: Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about A .

However, in the marijuana example, instead of supporting the goal, the values premise provides support within a linked argument configuration. This form of argument is illustrated in figure 2

where the application of the argumentation scheme for practical reasoning is shown by the notation PR in the round argument node.




Figure 2: Use of Value-based Practical Reasoning in the Marijuana Example

What is shown is that the argument represented visually in figure 2 uses value-based practical reasoning in a different way. Values are used along with the goal and the means to derive the conclusion for action. The goal, the means and the values work together as premises that, when all taken together, support the conclusion to take a form of action. Be sure to note however that this way of interpreting the argument given in the marijuana example does not conform to the argumentation scheme above for value-based practical reasoning. In the scheme, the goal is supported by the agent's set of values. In the argumentation shown in figure 2, the values work alongside the goal premise and the means premise. Perhaps it is possible somehow to interpret the marijuana argument in a different way so that the values support the goal. But before we discuss this issue we need to examine the example further.

Disputes about values can be more difficult to resolve than factual disputes. For example, in evidence-based medicine, one objective is the use of research evidence to reduce unnecessary variations in medical practices, such as prescribing medications and diagnostic testing, so as to eliminate the influence of values in decision-making (Upshur and Colak, 2001, 284). Although recent advocates of evidence-based medicine have emphasized the importance of integrating patient values with clinical expertise in medical decision-making, so far, these advocates have provided few methods for integrating patient values with clinical experience.

It could be conjectured that most or all of the statements in the example have underlying values that are important. For instance, "According to the negative perception, marijuana is harmful and dangerous" plays on the assumption that there is a problem to be solved in the first place. If there were not competing perceptions, or a will to change perceptions, the premise would be irrelevant. So, the problem to be solved, changing the opinion of mothers, relies on the values that underlie both positions, otherwise, there would be no problem in the first place.

4. Argument Strategy in the Marijuana Example

In figure 3 it is shown how the selection of the target audience is carried out at the opening stage by means of four arguments. The first argument leads to the conclusion that the strategic effort of the persuasion dialogue should be directed towards the goal of persuading moms to accept the claim that marijuana can contribute to health. Also, indications are given that the key focus of the exercise should be on the soccer moms, an influential group.




Figure 3: Selection of a Target Audience in the Marijuana Example

In this instance, the goal should be to persuade moms that marijuana boosts health, but one sub-audience of the moms is especially influential. A *linchpin audience* is here defined as one that, if you can reach and persuade its members to accept the proposition that you are promoting, it will have a rhetorical effect of persuading other members outside the linchpin audience to also accept the same proposition. Focusing on a linchpin audience can have a powerful rhetorical effect for mass audience persuasion. Here the linchpin audience is the ‘soccer moms’.

The audience selection strategy proposed has the following key elements: first, the target audience should be mothers; second, instead of trying to directly attack the opposing thesis that cannabis is bad, because it is associated with drug lords and so forth, it should be positively argued to mothers that cannabis has health benefits. This can be done by associating its use with medical treatments that are now becoming more widely accepted, tested, and put into place by legislation. The rhetorical strategy is one of indirect persuasion. The aim is to achieve general acceptance of marijuana use in public opinion, and the persuasion strategy recommended is to aim to persuade the target audience of mothers to change their view of cannabis. The strategy is to accentuate the positive for this target audience by basing it on scientific evidence and assumptions about what is generally accepted as evidence by the wider audience.

The article goes on to say that the persuasion strategy most suitable to solve the problem of shifting public opinion towards acceptance of cannabis is to emphasize the health benefits of using marijuana. Three reasons are given for the claim that there is evidence of growing acceptance of the therapeutic use of marijuana. The first is the claim that a third of American adults use alternative medicines. The second is that more and more research papers now promote cannabis as a natural substitute for pharmaceuticals. Supporting this claim is the statement that it has been used to treat diseases such as cancer by stimulating nerves. The third reason is that there have been large government research grants to a university to expand marijuana growth for medical research. These three reasons are given to show that there is evidence for the growing public acceptance of the proposition that marijuana contributes to health rather than detracting from it or being a danger to it.

In the marijuana example, the target audience to be initially persuasion is that of the soccer moms, a linchpin audience that is used to try to reach and persuade a broader audience to change public acceptance of the proposition that marijuana can contribute to health. Here the notion of

the audience is very important, and in general it is centrally important to this kind of persuasion dialogue that the message be aimed at a specific target audience and that the argument should be based on the commitments of that audience. But in the marijuana example, the audience is not an active participant in the argument. What kinds of arguments could be used to persuade this audience to acceptance of marijuana? The argumentation strategy is shown in figure 4.




Figure 4: Argumentation Strategy in the Marijuana Example

Figure 4 shows how the selected strategy is supported by three arguments used to support the conclusion that there is growing public acceptance for the proposition that marijuana can contribute to health. This argumentation supports the conclusion that the strategy should be to emphasize the health benefits of marijuana.

The type of dialogue instantiated by this example is definitely a species of persuasion dialogue, but one that is different from the legal trial, the forensic debate, or other types of persuasion dialogue recognized so far. The outstanding characteristic of this type of dialogue is that it is fundamentally important that it should aim at persuading a mass audience by dividing that mass audience into sub-audiences and by focusing on a particular type of audience that is taken to be a linchpin. It could be called mass audience persuasion dialogue (MAPD) of the kind familiarly used in marketing and in political discourse used to persuade a mass audience.

5. Mass Persuasion as a Legitimate Type of Argumentation

There are four defining characteristics of a persuasion dialogue as a normative construct representing a successful type of argumentation for use in changing the commitments of a target audience. First, the audience must accept all the premises of the argument put forward. Second, the argument must fit the form of an argumentation scheme of the kind that all parties in the dialogue have previously accepted or are willing to accept as binding on them. Third, it must be true that the audience did not previously accept the conclusion. Fourth, on the basis of the arguments meeting these three requirements, the respondent must come to accept the conclusion.

Mass persuasion dialogue is a legitimate type of persuasion dialogue because it is and properly should be based on the commitments of the audience.

Rhetorical persuasion of the kind illustrated in the example is a species of persuasion dialogue insofar as the arguments put forward by the rhetorical speaker need to be commitments of the audience to whom the argumentation is directed. This species of persuasion dialogue does not aim at a resolution of conflict of opinions by showing that the viewpoint of the audience is wrong or can be refuted. Instead, its criterion of success is persuasion of the audience to accept a particular proposition by getting them to accept this proposition as a commitment. This aspect of the paper has enabled us to learn something interesting and useful about rhetorical persuasion. The analytical findings of the paper enable the formulation of ten rules for building a mass persuasion strategy that a rhetorical speaker can use to achieve this goal.

1. Identify the proposition you as the proponent want to get accepted (the ultimate conclusion).
2. Identify the mass audience a_0 you are trying to persuade to accept this proposition.
3. Divide up the mass audience into three subsets: a_1 : those who already accept the proposition and do not need to be persuaded, a_2 those who cannot be persuaded, or are not worth persuading, and a_3 , those who can be persuaded and are worth persuading.
4. An important criterion for choosing a_3 is if they are a linchpin group, meaning a group who, if persuaded, will carry along others in a_0 such that the mass audience will also be persuaded.
5. Aim your efforts of persuasion at audience a_3 .
6. Base your efforts on evidence that a_3 will accept (especially scientific evidence).
7. Base your efforts on the values accepted by a_3 .
8. Base your efforts on factual propositions generally accepted by the mass audience a_0 .
9. Take both relevant pro arguments and relevant con arguments into account.
10. Build an argument structure so you can see if there are gaps in your chain of argumentation leading to the ultimate conclusion, and aim your main efforts of persuasion at filling them.

MAPD is a species of persuasion dialogue because the goal is to aim your argumentation at the commitments of a target audience to try to change these commitments so that the audience will either (a) carry out a particular action, or (b) come to accept a proposition it is not currently committed to. This kind of dialogue is commonly thought to be rhetorical in nature, because the goal is to use argumentation to achieve the result of changing the opinion of the mass audience. It is widely recognized that the argumentation used does not have to be balanced, rational or logical in every way (Tindale, 2016). Nonetheless, a mass persuasion attempt that uses appropriate logical reasoning, viz. value-based practical reasoning, to try to influence a public audience can have a logical aspect. What has been shown is that rhetoric and logic are more closely connected than many would care to admit.

It has been widely held that the opinions of the crowd are emotional rather than rational, and that, therefore, using a strictly logical sequence of argument to achieve your goal of persuasion would not generally be a good strategic method of persuasion. There is something to this view in some instances but as a general view it is simplistic. It depends on an outdated view of logical reasoning and rational thinking that was dominant in the Enlightenment. It has since been challenged by recent work in argumentation showing that everyday reasoning is based on defeasible argumentation schemes that all of us use all the time in our everyday lives. Hence the use of defeasible argumentation schemes, such as the one for value-based practical reasoning, are vitally important for argumentation in mass persuasion.

6. Four Problems with Value-based Practical Reasoning

Value-based practical reasoning has an advantage over instrumental practical reasoning because it can be used to resolve conflicts between opposed arguments by using a priority ordering of values. But its use poses a dilemma. On the one hand, using the value-based reasoning scheme in cases such as the marijuana example reveals four problems. On the other hand, reaching a justifiable choice on what to do in a particular set of circumstances might arrive at a wrong decision, if it is always done purely on the basis of instrumental practical reasoning. Yet again, introducing value-based practical reasoning brings with it a different set of problems that make it much harder to apply successfully to real examples.

The first problem is that in cases of conflicts of values it may not be possible to resolve the conflict for two reasons. One is that the value on the one side may not be higher or lower than that of the value on the other side in the priority ordering. Another is that in group deliberations, the values of the one side advocating a certain course of action may be different from the values advocating a different course of action, and it may be impossible to get either party to change its values, or to agree that the values of the opposed side should have a higher priority.

The second problem is the difficulty of changing or retracting a person's values. Values are different from goals, because goals are essentially commitments that can be easily retracted or modified in many cases through the process of argumentation. Values, however, tend to be more difficult to change or retract. Values are internal states that are more like beliefs. It is often very hard to try to figure out what another party's values really are, just as it can be very hard to try to determine what another party's beliefs really are. It is very hard in many instances to figure out what one's own values or beliefs are. Values and beliefs are internal and subjective.

The third problem is that postulating the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning by taking the values to always support particular goals does not always work straightforwardly when trying to build an argument diagram using the value-based practical reasoning scheme. Defining value-based practical reasoning in such a way that values always support goals did not appear to work in the marijuana example. In this example, as shown in figure 2, the values premise works alongside the means premise in a linked argument structure.

The fourth problem is that in many cases of group deliberation on what to do, it must be expected that the values of the participants may differ. There is nothing wrong with that. It is also normal for participants in a persuasion dialogue to have different values. The problem is that disputes about values can be more difficult to resolve than factual disputes. Values, such as freedom, equality, fairness, health, family values, the value of respect for hard work, and so forth, can be contained in the commitment stores of the participants, but they are there at a high level of abstraction. So the participants in a persuasion dialogue or a deliberation may disagree about how a particular value applies or does not apply to specific factual circumstances of the case. Values can even conflict, for example in classic cases of medical ethics (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). At the end of the persuasion dialogue, the participants may agree about the factual circumstances of the case, but may continue to disagree about personal values, or how these values apply to the circumstances of a case.

7. Conclusions

The rhetorical strategy in the marijuana example is its use of value-based practical reasoning aimed at what are taken to be the values of the target audience. The argumentation is cleverly based on an appeal to family values. Figure 1 showed that the formulation of the persuasion problem at the opening stage in the marijuana example was based on the premise that health is an important goal for the majority that forms public opinion. It was shown in figure 2 that the rhetorical action recommended, namely to emphasize the health benefits of cannabis to mothers, was based on the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning. In figure 3 it was shown how the goal of the mass persuasion attempt was to persuade moms that marijuana boosts the value of health by appealing to the target audience of soccer moms. The cleverness of the rhetorical strategy is apparent in the description of the circumstances of the case depicting a soiree in Denver where the women discuss the delicate flavors of vanilla sea-salt caramels laced with marijuana. The strategy of persuasion is to depict use of marijuana as fitting in with family values.

This example shows that arguments from positive or negative values can operate as individual arguments in their own right independently of either of the schemes for practical reasoning. The first argumentation scheme (Walton, 2015, 26) represents the argument from positive value.

Major Premise: If value V is positive, it supports commitment to goal G .

Minor Premise: Value V is positive as judged by agent a .

Conclusion: V is a reason for a to commit to goal G .

The negative counterpart is called argument from negative value (Walton, 2015, 26).

Major Premise: If value V is negative, it supports retracting commitment from goal G .

Minor Premise: Value V is negative as judged by agent a .

Conclusion: V is a reason for a to retract commitment to goal G .

These schemes show that arguments taking the form of value-based practical reasoning can be attacked in a number of different ways by the asking appropriate critical questions, and also by the putting forward counterarguments based on different and opposed values.

The following list of seven critical questions (Walton, 2007, 234) match the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning.

(CQ1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with G ?

(CQ2) How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) my values V ?

(CQ3) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be considered?

(CQ4) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of considerations of efficiency in bringing about G ?

(CQ5) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of my values V ?

(CQ6) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about A ?

(CQ7) What consequences of my bringing about A that might have even greater negative value than the positive value of G should be taken into account?

These critical questions which could be asked in the marijuana example show that values enter in not just as supporting the goal of the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning. Also, figure 2 showed that using the argumentation scheme for value-based practical

reasoning by taking the values to only support the goal and the goal premise of the scheme does not always work. Accordingly, there is a need for the value-based practical reasoning scheme to be reconfigured as follows.

Premise 1: I have a goal G .

Premise 2: G is consistent with or supported by my set of values, V .

Premise 3: Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about G .

Premise 4: Bringing about A is consistent with or supported by my set of values, V .

Conclusion: Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about A .

The analysis of the marijuana example showed that there is a rationale for the argumentation in the example as a legitimate argument within the framework provided by this new version of the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning. The analysis of this example using argumentation schemes shows that the argumentation in the marijuana example is a strategic sequence of value-based practical reasoning used for the rhetorical purpose of attempting to overcome the traditional negative perception of marijuana. The basic reason why the argumentation is rhetorically persuasive is its use of value-based practical reasoning and generally accepted opinions about what is acceptable. The argument does not appear to be intended to be part of a critical discussion where the arguments of the one side are being tested against those of the other side. It is a straight example of the building of an argument strategy for rhetorical persuasion to shift the balance of public opinion about marijuana use.

What has been shown is that the argumentation in the marijuana example is a defeasible type of argument that is operative in a context where there is a conflict of opinions generally about whether marijuana should be accepted as a medical treatment and even be more widely decriminalized. Any rhetorical argument put forward by exponents of the one side can be expected to be vigorously contested by those holding opposed values about the consequences of adopting these proposals. The conclusion of this paper is that the argumentation in this controversy can be configured in a much better way for analyzing and evaluating the argumentation in it illustrated by this example by adopting this new version of the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning and using it along with the proposed set of critical questions.

Further work on mass persuasion dialogue needs to address an additional common problem about value-based practical reasoning. In cases of conflicts of values it may not be possible to resolve the conflict. It is the goal of formal argumentation models of value-based reasoning to use formal systems to resolve such conflicts. In principle, the method of argumentation schemes and critical questions set out above is a tool that can, at least in some cases, resolve such conflicts. But if the audience has a different set of values from those of the rhetorical speaker attempting to change their views on how to proceed in deliberation, something that is commonly expected in rhetorical situations, a common outcome to be expected is that this method will show that there can be arguments on both sides. Presumably this is not the outcome that the rhetorical speaker wants.

Values are different from goals. Goals can be changed but there is the difficulty of changing or retracting a person's values using dialectical argumentation. That is why it is important to recognize that there are two species of practical reasoning, instrumental practical reasoning and value-based practical reasoning, each with its own set of critical questions.

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